Microsoft 365 3 min read

Does MFA still stop a fake SharePoint sign-in page?

Attackers can relay your sign-in and your MFA code live into a real Microsoft session. Why a code is not enough, and what to check.

The question

"We turned on MFA for everyone. A staffer got a PDF that looked like a SharePoint share, clicked View & Enroll and typed in his code. Are we still exposed?"

What we told them

Yes, possibly. MFA is not wrong. A code you type into a page is the weak kind of MFA, and this week's reporting shows why.

Researchers at Zerobec published a write-up on 5 Nov 2026 of a kit they call PhantomDOM. The email has no message text and one PDF. The PDF looks like a SharePoint sharing notice with a “View & Enroll” button. The button sends the victim through a chain of redirects to a page that looks like a Microsoft “Verify it's you” check.

The page is not the real sign-in. It is a live picture of one. The researchers describe an attacker-run browser that streams a copy of the Microsoft sign-in page to the victim. Keystrokes, pasted text and MFA codes go to that browser in real time. The real Microsoft session is created on the attacker's side. In their controlled test, the session was used to open two Outlook messages. The victim then lands on a real DocuSign error page, “Activation Not Found”, a decoy that looks like a broken document link.

Nothing was stolen from the user's laptop, and nothing on it looked wrong. The code did its job. It just went to the wrong person.

Here is our opinion. “We have MFA” is the sentence that ends too many security reviews. Ask which kind. A text code, an authenticator code and a push approval can all be relayed. Microsoft's own guidance on a related campaign, published 10 Sep 2026, is phishing-resistant MFA enforced through Conditional Access. Zerobec recommends origin-bound FIDO2 passkeys. Their write-up does not claim to have tested a passkey against this kit, so we will not claim it either. It notes only that the attacker opened a passkey creation flow and did not finish it.

What we would do first: find out who still signs in with a code, move admins and finance to passkeys, and make sure someone can revoke a user's sessions in minutes, not days.

The takeaway

A typed MFA code can be handed to an attacker as it is typed. This week, list who still signs in by code, start passkeys with admins and finance, and confirm you know how to revoke a user's sessions.

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